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Capitalist Agriculture and Labour Contracting 
in Northern Peru, 1880-1905 
by M I C H A E L J. G O N Z A L E S * 
Introduction 
Latin Americanists have become increasingly intrigued with questions 
concerning rural labour and oppression. In recent publicadons, traditional 
interpretations of peonage, labour contracting, wage labour and other topics 
have been questioned by historians with access to new documentary materials. 
Peru has been the setting for much of this discussion because of the important 
changes which occurred during the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries and the unusual opportunity to understand them since the creation 
of the Archivo del Fuero Agrario.1 
Much of the interest in Peru has centered on the expansion of the sugar 
industry and the efforts of sugar planters to reach out into the highlands to 
acquire labourers from among peasant communities. This process has been 
referred to as enganche, from the verb enganchar, meaning to hook or to 
entrap. At the time, it evoked the wrath of the pro-Indian intelligentsia who 
wrote exposes condemning the system as little better than slavery.2 While 
their heart was in the right place, these writers did not have the detachment, 
access to documentary materials nor the advantage of historical perspective to 
write completely accurate and unbiased accounts. Nevertheless, until recently 
they were the principal sources for studying enganche. 
This is reflected in the early work of Peter F. Klaren and others where 
unsuspecting highlanders are tricked and exploited at every turn by un-
* The author wishes to thank Senor Humberto Rodriguez Pastor for assistance in 
gathering material and Professors Roger M. Haigh and Peter Von Sivers for their 
useful comments on an earlier draft. 
1
 Much of the recent research on Peruvian agrarian history is reviewed by Arnold J. 
Bauer in 'Rural Workers in Spanish America: Problems in Peonage and Oppres­
sion,' Hispanic American Historical Review, No. 59 (February, 1979), pp. 34-64. 
2
 Works critical of enganche include: Alberto Ulloa Sotomayor, 'La organizaci6n 
social y legal del trabajo en el Peru,' (Ph.D. Diss., Universidad de San Marcos, 
1916), Chapter XI; Marco Aurelio Denegri, La crisis del enganche (Lima, 1 9 1 1 ) ; 
Francisco Mostajo, 'Algunas ideas sobre la cuestion obrera (contrato de enganche),' 
(Ph.D. Diss., Universidad de Arequipa, 1913) ; and Dora Mayer de Zulen, El 
indigena peruano o los cien anos de republica libre e independiente (Lima, 1921). 
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scrupulous labour contractors and hacendados. As in the Indianist tracts of 
the early twentieth century, deception, violence and indebted peonage are 
emphasized as the methods used to get peons down to the coast and to keep 
them there.3 With the availability of estate and contractor letter files, how­
ever, a different picture of enganche is emerging. Klaren, for example, after 
reading some of the new materials, modified his interpretadon to argue that 
coercion and peonage were paramount only during the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries, after which monetary reward was the principal 
mechanism behind enganche.* 
In a revisionist essay, Arnold J. Bauer recently reviewed much of the recent 
literature which utilizes heretofore unavailable hacienda records. Bauer 
devotes considerable space to Peru and the topic of enganche, although the 
bulk of the new research in this area is only now appearing in print. 
Bauer argues that, because of competition for labour, contractors had to offer 
peons good wages and working conditions, which were readily accepted. 
If indebted peonage and force were ever utilized, they apparendy were never 
important variables in labour contracting.5 
Bauer's article has elicited a vigorous rebuttal from Brian Loveman who 
criticizes him for over-generalizing and ignoring older studies which docu­
ment cases of worker abuse. For the northern coast of Peru, Loveman also 
cites a recent study which shows a more complex picture of labour contracting 
and worker-planter relations.0 
What follows is an attempt to shed light on this controversial topic. 
T o do so, I have consulted new primary source materials and placed the 
problem more within the context of economic change, both on the regional 
and international levels, and evolving methods of social and political control. 
My findings lead me to argue that the genesis of enganche, the crucial transi­
tion period from 1880 to 1905, combined elements of coercion and violence 
with capital incentives from the onset. 
The development of enganche reflected the linkage of the expanding export 
sector on the coast, which had available large amounts of capital, with the 
3
 Peter F. Klaren, Modernization, Dislocation, and Aprismo: Origins of the Peruvian 
Apista Party, 1870-1932 (Austin, Texas, 1973), pp. 26-8. For a similar view, see 
Ernesto Yepes del Castillo, Pent, 1820-1920 (Lima, 1972), pp. 209-13. 
4
 Peter F. Klaren, 'The social and economic consequences of modernization in the 
Peruvian sugar industry, 1870-1930, ' in Kenneth Duncan and Ian Rutledge (eds.), 
Land and Labour in Latin America (Cambridge, 1977), p. 293. 
5
 Bauer, op. cit., p. 38. 
8
 Brian Loveman, 'Critique of Arnold J. Bauer's "Rural Workers in Spanish America: 
Problems of Peonage and Oppression,"' Hispanic American Historical Review, 
No. 59 (August, 1979), pp. 478-86. Also see Bauer's reply in the same issue, 
pp. 486-90. 
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largely subsistence economy of the northern sierra where demographic and 
economic pressures made migration attractive. Thus, sugar planters could 
generally control the flow of migration to their plantations through offering 
cash advances and wages to labour contractors and peasants. However, this 
did not preclude contractors from resorting to duplicity and coercion to meet 
labour quotas when necessary. 
Planters gauged their labour needs primarily on the basis of production 
schedules. Ideally, they sought to maximize production at all times but could 
not always afford to do so. During these years, their principal barometer for 
investment in labour was the prevailing price of sugar on the world market. 
This was not necessarily a precise calculation but rather a guideline to 
anticipated profits. 
Those peasants who responded voluntarily to work on the coast were 
attracted by the relatively high wages paid on the plantations. They migrated 
at first to earn spot incomes during slack periods in the agricultural cycle 
back home, but gradually chose to maximize their incomes by remaining on 
the coast for longer periods of time. Indebted workers who wanted to return 
home, however, were often forced to remain behind until their debts had 
been repaid. 
Indebted bondage arose from the specific labour needs of the sugar cane 
plantations. Because these plantations relied on irrigation as opposed to 
seasonal rainfall, they planted and harvested almost year round. This made it 
imperative to have a stable work force, and compelled planters, especially 
during periods of labour scarcity, to attempt to hold on to indebted workers. 
However, on the northern coast peonage did not work as efficiently as it is 
generally portrayed in the literature. 
Historical and geographical background 
By the late nineteenth century, sugar production was becoming increas­
ingly concentrated in the northern departments of La Libertad and 
Lambayeque. This reflected ecological advantages, particularly superior soils 
and more hours of intense sunlight which matured the cane more rapidly, as 
well as the dynamic leadership of a new group of planters with access to large 
amounts of capital. The largest plantations were located in four valleys, the 
Moche (or Santa Catalina), Chicama, Sana and Lambayeque, which were 
irrigated by Andean rivers. The regions in between the valleys were virtually 
uncultivated owing to the almost total lack of rainfall on the coast.7 
7
 Michael Joseph Gonzales, 'Cayalu': The Formation of a Rural Proletariat on a 
Peruvian Sugar Cane Plantation, 1 8 7 5 - 1 9 3 3 ' (Ph.D. Diss., U.C., Berkeley, 1978), 
Chapters I and II. 
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1968), p. 13 . 
The principal problems facing the sugar industry during the late nine­
teenth century were low sugar prices and labour shortages. The price of sugar 
began to fall in the 1870s and continued downwards, with an occasional 
upswing, into the twentieth century. This was the result of supply outstrip-
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ping demand as beet sugar was introduced on to the world market at the 
same time that cane growers were increasing production.8 
Sugar cane plantations on the Peruvian coast, as elsewhere in the Americas, 
had relied upon black slavery since the sixteenth century. When abolition 
finally came to Peru in 1854, planters utilized the indemnification they 
received from the government for the loss of their slaves to import over 
100,000 Chinese indentured servants. The Chinese remained the mainstay of 
coastal agriculture until 1874 when the British and Chinese governments 
combined to bring a halt to the coolie trade.9 
Planters attempted to combat the ensuing labour shortage as well as low 
sugar prices by carrying out a series of technological improvements designed 
to eliminate jobs and increase production. The principal improvements con­
sisted of mill modernization, installation of portable railroads to carry cane 
to the mill, construction of railroad lines connecting plantations with coastal 
ports and heavier reliance on steam powered tractors.10 
Initially, planters did not seriously consider converting to Peruvian wage 
labour because the change-over would be expensive and risky, particularly 
during the chaotic years during and immediately after the War of the Pacific 
(1879-1884). The decision to recruit local peasants finally came as the result 
of the growing unproductivity of the Chinese and improving economic and 
political conditions which favoured increased investment in labour. 
This can be seen through the experience of the sugar cane plantation 
Cayalti. One of roughly a dozen plantations which produced the bulk of 
Peruvian sugar, Cayalti spanned over 77,000 acres in the heart of the Sana 
Valley. The estate was an important sugar producer as early as 1622 and it is 
one of the principal co-operatives on the north coast today. The history of the 
estate in the modern period is tied to the Aspillaga family which used its 
sugar fortune to rise to a position of social and political prominence. The 
Aspillagas purchased the estate in 1859 and managed it throughout the 
period under consideration here. 1 1 
8
 See Appendix A. 
9
 Frederick P. Bowser, The African Slave in Colonial Peru, 1524-1650 (Stanford, 
1974); Watt Stewart, Chinese Bondage in Peru (Durham, North Carolina, 1951) ; 
Arnold J. Meagher, 'The Introduction of Chinese Laborers to Latin America: The 
"Coolie Trade," 1847 -1874 ' (Ph.D. Diss., U.C., Davis, 1975). 
1 0
 Gonzales, op. cit. Chapter III. 
1 1
 Susan Ramirez Horton, 'The Sugar Estates of the Lambayeque Valley, 1670-1800: 
A Contribution to Peruvian Agrarian History,' (MA. Thesis, University of Wis­
consin, Madison, 1973), p. 14. The purchase date of Cayalti is in the memorandum 
dated 12 February 1946, El Archivo del Fuero Agrario, Lima. For the size of 
Cayalti, see Certificacidn de los titulos de la hacienda Cayalti con sus anexos, 
17 November 1920, El Archivo del Fuero Agrario. 
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The Aspillagas viewed the end to the coolie trade with great alarm writing 
that the Chinese are ' . . . everything to our agriculture and the best labourers 
who we can obtain,' and beseeching the Lord to allow immigration to 
continue.12 Although their prayers were not answered, the Aspillagas con­
tinued to believe that new sources of servile labour could be located. In the 
meantime, they held on to their aging Chinese workers, sometimes resorting 
to indebted peonage and force. The Chinese, however, were becoming in­
creasingly unproductive. For example, in June, 1891 the Aspillagas described 
300 of their 420 Chinese workers as ' . . . old and tired men.. . . ' They wrote 
that absenteeism was such a serious problem, especially on Mondays, that 
milling sometimes had to be stopped, and those Chinese who did work were 
only capable of handling skilled jobs, such as operating machinery.15 
The conclusion was inescapable that an alternative source of labour had to 
be found. Although this would be costly and uncertain, planters were en­
couraged by indications that the national economy and polity were stabilizing 
after years of anarchy. In particular, foreign credit was becoming increasingly 
available and a new oligarchy was forming around the Civilista Party in 
which sugar planters assumed a prominent role.1 4 
Labour supply 
Coast 
The commitment to labour contracting in the highlands was made by the 
Aspillagas in the late 1880s. But before then they had cautiously begun to 
recruit peasant labour from nearby towns and native communities on the 
coast. Coastal workers had worked from time to time at Cayalti in the past, 
usually on irrigation canals. Now Cayalti hoped to recruit large numbers of 
costenos, especially from the neighbouring town of Sana, to work at all jobs. 
1 2
 Antero Aspillaga Barrera to Ram6n Aspi'llaga Ferrebu, 14 June 1875, El Archivo 
del Fuero Agrario. The following abbreviations will be used throughout this article: 
Victor Aspillaga Taboada - V.A.T; Antero Aspillaga Barrera - A.A.B; Baldomero 
Aspillaga Barrera - B.A.B.; Ram6n Aspillaga Barrera - R.A.B.; Ram6n Aspillaga 
Ferrebu - R.A.F; Ismael Aspillaga Barrera - I.A.B; Aspillaga Hermanos (firm) -
A.H.; El Archivo del Fuero Agrario - A.F.A. 
1 3
 A.H. to A.H., 9 June 1891, A.F.A.; A.H. to A.H., 22 March 1892, A.F.A.; A.H. to 
A.H., 12 Oct. 1889, A.F.A.; A.H. to A.H., 15 Feb 1890, A.F.A.; A.H. to A.H., 
7 June 1893, A.F.A. 
1 4
 For a discussion of improving economic conditions in the 1890s, see Rosemary 
Thorp and Geoffrey Bertram, Peru 1890-1977 (New York, 1978). On increasing 
political stability and the emerging oligarchy, see Dennis Gilbert, The Oligarchy 
and the Old Regime in Peru (Ithaca, N.Y., 1977). Antero Aspillaga Barrera was one 
of the leading political figures of his day. 
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As early as 1879, the Aspillagas had cast an envious eye toward that small 
community. 
The peons and Chinos Libres are behaving well and little by little their numbers 
will increase - [but] what we want is for all of the Saneros to become our peons 
since they are the most secure and best suited for us because they are the closest.18 
Despite their economic and political influence, however, the Aspillagas 
were never able to recruit as many Saneros as they desired. As far as can be 
determined, the largest number of Saneros to work at Cayalti was 100 in 
1923, or 4.6 percent of the entire work force. Saneros stayed away from 
Cayalti for several reasons. Not only were they angry with the Aspillagas for 
having stolen much of their land, but they preferred to work on rice estates 
where the pay was higher and the work more to their liking.1 6 In general, 
they tended to move from estate to estate, rarely working in any one place for 
a long period of time. In fact, it was usually only during floods and other 
calamitous times that relatively large numbers of costefios could be found at 
Cayalti. The Aspillagas commented on coastal workers in 1889 as follows: 
Those from the coast, or zambos [persons of mixed black and Indian blood], are 
scarce and the Saneros, if you could round up 100 or so of them, we could not 
acclimatise them in any manner whatsoever, because the majority of them are 
lazy men who go around looking for a new patron every week, that is to say, 
looking for where they can do less. We need then authorization to send con­
tractors from the interior and from the coast, who will always be preferable for 
making loans with their own capital.. . . 
Presendy, with the rice harvest, the work force on the large [sugar] estates 
always diminishes because of the attraction that this work has for them, but happily 
this is already passing.17 
It seems likely that other north coast sugar plantations had similar experi­
ences with costefios. For example, the estate Pomalca in the Lambayeque 
Valley occasionally used coastal labour but the majority of its workers were 
non-costeiios.18 Peter Klaren argues in his book that many of the small 
farmers who sold out to the plantation Casa Grande in the Chicama Valley 
eventually came to work for that estate. He does not determine, however, 
whether or not they became resident workers, which is an important distinc­
tion.1 9 Some light can be shed on this issue by Victor Aspillaga Taboada, who 
visited the Chicama Valley in 1907 and observed that ' . . .from the town of 
1 0
 A.H. to A.H. 9 September 1879, A.F.A. 
1 8
 Gonzales, op. cit., pp. 218-22. 
1 7
 A.H. to A.H., 5 June 1889 (a), A.F.A. 
1 8
 Contratos de la Hacienda Pomalca, A.F.A.; and Douglas E. Horton, Haciendas and 
Co-operatives (Madison, Wisconsin, 1973), p. 18. 
1 0
 Klaren, Modernization, Dislocation, and Aprismo, Chapter II. 
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Paijan leave a large number [una buena cantidad] of people to work on this 
hacienda [Casa Grande] by jobs.' 2 0 
There is another, more fundamental, reason why costenos could have never 
constituted a majority of workers on coastal estates; namely, the north coast 
was too thinly populated to supply the thousands of workers sugar plantations 
required. This problem had existed since the Spanish conquest which had 
decimated the native population on the coast and forced planters to import 
black slaves.21 
Japan 
By the turn of the present century, planters had focused their attention 
on two new sources of labour: Japanese contract labourers and Peruvian 
peasants from the neighbouring highlands. Japanese immigration, how­
ever, proved to be a disappointment to both planters and immigrants. In 
the first place, only 17,764 Japanese entered Peru between 1898 and 1923, 
which was far short of the number needed. Furthermore, many immigrants 
quickly left Peru on their own accord or were expelled by planters. The 
problem actually began in Japan where emigration companies painted a 
pleasant picture of Peruvian plantation life. Once in Peru, the Japanese soon 
discovered that the coast was hot and unhealthy, and that planters often times 
refused to pay stipulated wages and even subjected workers to corporal 
punishment. For planters there soon developed a problem over wages because 
Japanese workers, according to their contracts, received a daily wage while 
Peruvian and Chinese workers were paid by piece work. In almost all cases, 
the Japanese ended up being paid more for less work. 
At Cayalti, the Japanese had a minimal impact, as only fifty workers were 
contracted and they lasted but two months. Neighbouring estates ordered 
more Japanese than Cayalti but the results were equally disappointing. 
Only in the Departments of Lima and Cafiete, on the central and southern 
coasts, did sugar plantations receive long-term benefits from Japanese immi­
gration.2 2 
Sierra 
Labour contracting in the northern sierra turned out to be the final solution 
to the labour needs of the sugar plantations. The sierra was the planters' last 
2
° V.A.T. to A.H., 18 June 1907, A.F.A. 
2 1
 Bowser, op. cit. 
2 2
 Gonzales, op. cit., pp. 2 1 5 - 1 8 ; Bill Albert, An Essay on the Peruvian Sugar 
Industry, 1880-1920 (Norwich, 1976), pp. 1038-1053. 
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resort, as the few serranos who they had employed in the past had either 
quickly fallen ill or had returned home after only a short stay.2 3 Now, how­
ever, they had little choice but to attempt to mobilize large numbers of high-
landers in order to save their industry. 
As it turned out, serranos had several reasons for wanting to migrate. 
The northern sierra was relatively populous, economically underdeveloped, 
and plagued by banditry, while the plantations paid good wages. The popula­
tion of the northern highlands was predominandy rural, congregated into 
towns, villages, native communities, and haciendas. In 1876 the Department 
of Cajamarca had a population of 213,000, while the highlands of the 
Department of La Libertad contained 119,500 inhabitants. The Province 
of Chota in Cajamarca, which became a centre for labour contracting, had a 
population of 51,000, only 11,000 less than the entire north coast, including 
urban areas. Moreover, according to the Census of 1876, two-thirds of the 
inhabitants of the northern sierra were either white or mestizo, so that the 
coast was not as culturally alien to them as it was to the Indians of the central 
and southern sierra.24 
The northern sierra was not a particularly prosperous region. The economy 
was predominandy agricultural and pastoral, except for some isolated mining 
activity in Hualgayoc (coal) and Pataz (gold). Cajamarquenos produced 
wheat, wool, sheep, mules, and minerals which they sold in adjacent towns 
and villages as well as in the Amazon Basin and on the coast. Revenues 
earned were primarily spent on the coast for cotton, sugar, salt, clothing, and 
mining equipment. In 1855, ^ s exchange, owing largely to the value of 
minerals, netted Cajamarquenos a surplus of 175,325 pesos.25 
Nevertheless, the majority of peasants did not share in this modest profit. 
For them, the key to prosperity was access to land, and this was a region of 
latifundia and minifundia. Thus, in 1903, Pelayo Puga, whose family owned 
a 737,000 acre estate in Cajamarca, wrote that land was either owned by 
huge haciendas or divided into extremely small plots. And even today 
Cajamarquenos recall that the problem of latifundia-minifundia was a key 
2 3
 Francisco de Rivero, Memoria o scan apuntamientos sobre la industria agricola del 
Peru y sobre algunos medios que pudieran adoptarse (Lima, 1845), pp. 2 1 - 2 ; 
[Domingo Elias and Juan Rodriguez], Inmigracidn de Chinos, ventajas que pro-
porcionan al pais (Lima, 1851), pp. 19-20. Both sources contain personal testimony 
by coastal sugar planters on this point. 
2 4
 Censo General de la Reptiblica del Peru, Formado en 1876, Vol. V, Huanuco, lea, 
Junin, Lambayeque, La Libertad (Lima, 1878). The only complete copy of the 
1876 census is in the Biblioteca de la Oficina Nacional de Estadisticas y Censos, 
Lima. 
2 5
 Juan Sarachaga, Ed. 'Estadistica fisica y politica del Departamento de Cajamarca 
(1855), ' in Coleccidn Fenix, Vol. XVII, Biblioteca Nacional, Lima. 
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reason why their ancestors migrated to the coast.26 Moreover, because of poor 
soils, ownership of two or three plots of land might not guarantee prosperity. 
For example, Baldomero Aspillaga Barrera observed in 1892 that the land­
scape of the Province of Hualgayoc, an area of recruitment by Cayalti, was 
either very hilly or barren fladand. He also noted that the coal industry in the 
region was already in decline, and this must have deprived many people of a 
livelihood.27 
Furthermore, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the lives 
and property of serranos were threatened by endemic banditry. For example, 
in 1902 the Sub-Prefect of Huamachuco, an area of heavy recruitment by 
estates in the Chicama and Santa Catalina Valleys, wrote to the Prefect, 
complaining that armed bands roamed the countryside, committing the worst 
possible crimes. He stated that in the Districts of Marcabal and Sarin towns 
were filled with 'thieves and assassins' who carried firearms in public, and he 
ended by pleading with the Prefect to create two new rural police stations.28 
In a similar vein, several citizens from Cutervo, a recruitment area frequendy 
exploited by estates from the Lambayeque Valley and occasionally by Cayalti, 
asked the central government in 1904 to create a new province for the sole 
purpose of controlling banditry. They wrote that the area was dominated by 
private armies which included bandits from Ecuador, Piura and Amazonas. 
Moreover, in Chota, people today remember that the prevalence of catde 
rusding was another reason why their ancestors migrated.2 9 
For all these reasons, therefore, serranos sought a better life on the coast. 
There, on sugar plantations they could earn a cash wage far superior to any 
paid in the sierra, except in a few mining areas. 
For serranos to replace Chinese, however, required a herculean effort. 
Thousands of peasants would have to be mobilized, transported to the coast 
in organized contingents, and preferably made to stay for long periods of 
time. By themselves, planters may have found this to have been an extremely 
difficult, if not impossible, task. Here, they were fortunate to acquire the 
services of labour contractors, or enganchadores, who largely succeeded 
in meeting their needs. 
2 8
 Pelayo Puga, La pita de brazos para la agricultura de la costa del Peru (Lima, 
1903); Interviews conducted by John Giditz in Cajamarca during the 1970s. 
Gitlitz kindly shared this information with me during a conversation in Lima on 
5 September 1974. 
2 7
 B.A.B. to A.H., 16 February 1892, A.F.A. 
2 8
 Memoria que presenta el Sub-Prefecto de la Provincia de Huamachuco a la Prefec-
tura del Departamento, May 26, 1902. Biblioteca Nacional, Lima. 
2 9
 Giditz Interviews. 'Los Hijos de Cutervo,' Proyectada Provincia de Cutervo (Lima, 
1904), in Coleccidn Fenix, Vol. XVII. Biblioteca Nacional, Lima. 
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Most labour contractors were serranos, and for logical reasons. Engancha-
dores had to be intimately familiar with the locales where they contracted, as 
only residents could be, and it was important that they be men of local 
influence, persons with access to labour and capital. Thus, it is not surprising 
that most enganchadores were either prosperous serrano merchants or 
hacendados. 
Serrano merchants, of course, had had contact with the coast for some 
time, buying and selling the products mentioned above. It is only logical, 
therefore, that they would have been familiar with the needs of coastal 
plantations and willing to become contractors to make more money. Besides, 
the more important contractors were allowed to operate stores on the planta­
tions, stocked with their own merchandise. This was an excellent business 
opportunity. 
Several enganchadores are specifically identified as either hacendados or 
merchants in the surviving records of north coast sugar plantations. For 
example, when Baldomero Aspillaga Barrera visited Cayalti's principal con­
tractor, Jose- Santos Medina Cedron, in February, 1892 he described him 
as the most important merchant in Bambamarca, and a very prestigious 
person within the community. Pomalca's principal contractor from 1900 to 
1933, Eduardo Tiravante, owned at least two haciendas in the Province of 
Chota, Churucancha and Mollebamba. Likewise, Daniel Orrego, who con­
tracted for both Pomalca and Cayalti in the Province of Santa Cruz, was a 
merchant-hacendado who at one point was governor of the province. 
Similarly, a woman contractor at Laredo in the Santa Catalina Valley, 
Matilde Martin Vda. de Pinillos, held usufruct over the estate Chusgon, 
which in 1913 extended over 295,000 acres and was home for 2,826 
persons.30 
Contractors tended to be persons of substance because position and wealth 
facilitated labour recruitment. A big merchant like Jose Santos Medina 
Cedron, for example, sold goods on credit to local peasants who agreed to 
discount their debt by working at Cayalti. In this fashion, Medina Cedron 
not only made a profit on sales but earned a commission from the Aspillagas, 
based on the amount of work done by peons under his contract.31 Owners 
and renters of haciendas, moreover, regularly supplied plantations with peons 
from their estates. Thus in May, 1897 an Aspillaga wrote: 'The peons from 
3 0
 B.A.B. to A.H., 16 February 1892, A.F.A.; Contract between Eduardo Tiravante 
and the Hacienda Pomalca, 20 June 1917 , A.F.A.; Contract between Daniel Orrego 
and the Hacienda Pomalca, 26 January 1910, A.F.A.; A.H. to A.H., 8 February 
1906, A.F.A.; Informe sobre la Hacienda Chusgon, 23 April 1958, A.F.A.; Planillas 
of the Plantation Laredo, 1900-1908, A.F.A. 
si B.A.B. to A.H., 16 February 1892, A.F.A. 
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Chota can only be contracted by gamonales from the area [as] they know 
and understand its complexities.. . . ' 3 2 Earlier, the Aspillagas had agreed 
to help Medina Cedron lease the Hacienda del Colegio in Chota because 
they felt that it would allow him to supply Cayalti with 100 more peons. 
Moreover, enganche contracts signed between Pomalca and Eduardo Tira-
vante generally stipulated that he supply from 200 to 250 peons from one or 
more of his estates in Chota. It is also significant that the only contractor 
found to recruit exclusively on the coast, Miguel Arbulu Gonzales, rented 
small to medium sized estates in Lambayeque.3 3 
Contractors who either owned or rented haciendas were able to force 
tenants and sub-tenants to fulfill rent obligations by working on the coast. 
This is documented for the estate Yaucan and for the haciendas studied by 
Solomon Miller in the highlands of La Libertad.3 4 
Nevertheless, enganchadores did not always have to resort to such tactics 
to recruit labour. In many cases, peons voluntarily agreed to work on the 
coast, owing to the economic and demographic pressures mentioned earlier. 
Peasants would either present themselves at a contractor's office or sign a 
contract while drunk at a fiesta. The latter practice was so common that 
planters helped contractors purchase alcohol for the occasions, and counted 
on receiving new recruits following major holidays.3 5 
Planters, for their part, preferred to deal with contractors who were 
merchants or merchant-hacendados. There were two basic reasons for this: 
this type of contractor could deliver more peons, and he was less of a financial 
risk. For example, at Pomalca contractors generally guaranteed repayment of 
all advances received from planters against seizure of their property in the 
sierra.36 
3 2
 A. H. to A.H., 3 May 1897, A.F.A. 
3 3
 Carlos J. Bachmann, Departamento de Lambayeque (Lima, 1921), pp. 145-6 ; 
George R. Fitz-Roy Cole, The Peruvians at Home (London, 1884), pp. 136, 149. 
Both sources mention the Arbulu family as estate owners. Miguel Arbulu Gonzdles 
appears as a labour contractor in Contratos de la Hacienda Pomalca, A.F.A.; A.H. 
to A.H., 24 June 1888, A.F.A.; Contracts between Eduardo Tiravante and the 
Hacienda Pomalca, 1 May 1912 and 20 June 1917 , A.F.A. 
3 4
 N. Tello to A.H., 20 March 1899, A . F . A ; V.A.T. to A.H., 20 March 1920, A.F.A.; 
Solomon Miller, 'Hacienda to Plantation in Northern Peru: The Process of Prole­
tarianization of a Tenant Farmer Society,' in Vol. Ill, Contemporary Change in 
Traditional Society, Julian Steward (ed.) (Urbana, 111., 1967), pp. 169-70. 
3
» A.H. to A.H., 27 June 1889, A.F.A.; A.H. to A.H., July 3 1 , 1889, A.F.A.; A.H. 
to A.H., 11 October 1892, A.F.A.; Correspondence of the labour contractor Catalino 
Coronado, A.F.A.; Interview with Galindo Bravo, CAP PucaW, 27 June 1975. 
Bravo was originally contracted to work at Pucala by Catalino Coronado. In 1975 
he was a member of the Consejo de Administration, CAP Pucala. 
3 8
 Contratos de la Hacienda Pomalca, A.F.A. 
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In return for a guarantee to supply a large number of peons (e.g. 250), 
planters frequently granted contractors monopoly rights to contract in a 
district. For example, Pomalca gave this right to Melchor Montoya Espino 
for the District of Bambamarca in 1900, and to the Tiravante brothers for 
the District of Chota several times between 1900 and 1930. Likewise, 
Cayalti extended this privilege to Medina Cedron for the District of Bam­
bamarca during the nineteenth century.37 
Still, even with monopoly privileges, competition for labour was intense. 
Thus, in November of 1919 there were twelve contractors recruiting in the 
District of Bambamarca with a total capital of S/.50,000 for making 
advances to peons.38 
Labor recruitment involved the signing of two contracts: one between 
plantation and contractor and another between contractor and peon. Peons 
received a cash advance from contractors, varying between 10 and 50 soles, 
which they agreed to repay with their labour on the coast. Peons might also 
agree to work off previous debts or rent. To assure repayment, the peon and 
a co-signer put up as collateral their possessions and labour, and surrendered 
all rights to contest the contract in court. Peons also agreed to work a certain 
number of days, typically ninety, in case they repaid their loans very quickly. 
Although it was unstated in the contract, peons discounted their debt in­
voluntarily. Thus, each pay-day either the contractor or the estate, depending 
on the source of capital for the loan, received the peon's wage (except for a 
small amount, generally 10 centavos) until the loan was repaid. Peons did not 
starve because they received a daily ration.38 
Planters attempted to control labour supply, in part, through contracts 
with enganchadores. These agreements obligated contractors to supply a 
number of peons within a certain period of time (usually one to two months) 
to work at whatever job the estate desired. Planters generally advanced con­
tractors enough money (usually by cheque) to cover the cost of loans to peons. 
To assure repayment, contractors sometimes put up as collateral property in 
the sierra, usually an estate or a business. Finally, enganchadores were granted 
a percentage of the total amount of wages earned by their peons as a com­
mission. A commission of 20 percent was common, although it fluctuated.40 
3 7
 Ibid.; Cayalti Correspondence. 
3 8
 S. Tello to A.H., 2 November 1919 , A.F.A. In 1919 dollars, S/. 50,000 = 524,000. 
3 9
 Contratos de enganche, Hda. Tuman, A.F.A.; Letter dated 19 June 1919, Cayalti 
Correspondence, A.F.A.; Ulloa Sotomayor. In 1900 dollars, S/. 50 = 524.25; S/. 
1 0 = 5 4 . 8 5 ; 40 centavos = 5.825. 
4 0
 Contratos de la Hacienda Pomalca, A.F.A.; Various contracts in the Cayalti 
Correspondence, A.F.A. 
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Demand for labour 
The preceding discusion has presented the sierra, or supply side, of labour 
contracting. What remains to be analysed is the plantation, or demand side, 
of the process. Here Cayalti represents an example of a modernizing estate 
with basic similarities with other north coast plantations. Enganche viewed 
from Cayalti shows that labour contracting was a relatively efficient system 
which responded to capital. Thus, planters could determine the flow of 
labour, under normal market conditions, through the flow of money to 
enganchadores. Ultimately, the price of sugar determined how much capital 
the Aspillagas were willing to allocate for enganche and how many peons 
they could pay, although unforeseen events, such as wars and droughts, 
occasionally disrupted established patterns of supply. 
The Aspillagas' first serious experience with enganche began in September, 
1878. This first encounter, however, proved to be so disappointing that they 
adopted a policy of restraint and caution over the next few years which 
prevented the large scale recruitment of serranos. The cause for the initiation 
of labour contracting was a severe labour shortage caused by the construction 
of a new mill, which took men out of their regular jobs, and the end to 
Chinese immigration. The Aspillagas negotiated with an enganchador to 
transfer 50 serranos from a neighbouring estate, and advanced him an 
additional S/. 1,300 to contract more workers. At the same time, they 
forwarded S/.400 to another contractor to find more workers for Cayalti. 
Within a month, however, all but a few of the serranos had repaid their loans 
and returned to the sierra, and no new workers had arrived to take their 
place.4 1 
After this disappointing experience, the Aspillagas were very reluctant to 
advance money to contractors and to pay them standard commissions. 
Under the circumstances, it is not surprising that very few serranos were 
contracted to work at Cayalti.4 2 The Aspillagas' first real success with 
enganche came in 1886 when they signed an agreement with Medina Cedr6n 
of Bambamarca, who agreed to contract peons without receiving advances. 
This he could do by allowing peasants who had purchased goods on credit at 
his store to work off their debts on the coast. Medina Cedron was successful 
in part because Bambamarca had recovered much more rapidly from the 
war than had neighbouring areas, which aided his store and, consequendy, 
« A.H. to A.H., 24 September 1878, A .F .A; A.H. to A.H., 30 September 1878, 
A.F .A; A H . to A.H., 21 October 1878, A .F .A; A.H. to A.H., 14 October 1879, 
A.F.A. 
4 2
 Existencia de trabajadores..., 8 June 1882, A.F.A.; A.A.B. to A.H., 9 December 
1884, A.F.A.; A.H. to A.H., 12 February 1885, A.F.A.; A.H. to A.H., 26 February 
1885, A.F.A. 
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his enganche business. Thus, he was able to double his supply of peons at 
Cayalti from 60 in July, 1886, to 120 in March, 1888.4 3 
At that juncture, the Aspillagas were enthusiastic about the future of 
enganche, since Medina Cedron accepted all financial risks and serranos had 
proved themselves to be good workers.4 4 Besides, the Aspillagas had no choice 
but to continue contracting serranos, as each year the Chinese population 
grew smaller and less capable of manning the development of Cayalti. 
As a result, management decided to liberalize its policy on advances and to 
broaden the scope of labour contracting to include other parts of the sierra. 
Thus, at the Aspillagas' urging, Medina Cedron signed a new contract agree­
ing to contract in Chota and to supply Cayalti with a minimum of 200 
peons. T o assist him, the Aspillagas agreed to pay 25 percent of all advances 
and to help him gain the lease to the Hacienda del Colegio.^ 
These measures were successful in part because of changing conditions in 
the sierra. Perhaps most significantly, by the end of the decade more 
merchants, hacendados and peasants were aware of the benefits of enganche. 
Moreover, the chaotic conditions of the war years in Chota were now quieted; 
and the mining industry in Bambabarca, which had taken labour away from 
the coast, was now declining. Thus, by May, 1890, the serrano population at 
Cayalti, composed mostly of people from Bambamarca, had grown to over 
23o.4 a 
There was, however, a definite seasonality to labour supply at Cayalti 
during the 1880s, evolving around climate and planting seasons in the sierra. 
Peons tended to repay their loans in time to return home by September or 
October to plant crops before the first rains. Thereafter, many peons would 
return to the plantations as early as November but would tend to leave again 
by February or March, which were the hottest months on the coast and 
coincided with a second planting season in the sierra.47 
The 1890s witnessed a movement away from this pattern as serranos began 
to be re-contracted on the estate, which led to the formation of a more 
permanent work force, and new contracts were signed with enganchadores 
in Bambamarca, Santa Cruz and Sorochuco. As a result, the number of 
« A.H. to A.H., 30 July 1886, A.F.A.; A.H. to A.H., 29 March 1888, A.F.A.; A.A.B. 
to R.A.B. and I.A.B., 10 October 1888, A.F.A. 
4 4
 A.H. to A.H., 12 November 1886, A.F.A.; A.H. to A.H., 31 July 1885, A.F.A. 
« A.H. to A.H., 5 June 1889(a), A.F.A.; A.H. to A.H., 22 June 1889, A.F.A.; A.H. 
to A.H., 11 July 1889(a), A.F.A.; A.H. to A.H., 24 June 1888, A.F.A. 
4 0
 A.H. to A.H., 7 May 1890, A.F.A. 
4 7
 A.H. to A.H., 16 October 1885, A.F.A.; A.H. to A.H., 23 September 1888, A.F.A.; 
A.H. to A.H., 3 October 1889(a), A.F.A.; A.H. to A.H., 15 November 1889, 
A.F.A.; A.H. to A.H., 16 November 1891, A.F.A.; A.H. to A.H., 16 February 
1892, A.F.A. 
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serranos at Cayalti increased from 500 in 1895 to 900 by the turn of the 
century.48 
As all north coast sugar cane plantations converted to serrano labour, 
enganche became a more competitive business, driving wages and contractors' 
commissions upwards. This was a serious problem for the Aspillagas, and 
presumably other planters, because the price of sugar throughout the decade 
was dangerously low. The Aspillagas were caught between their growing 
inability to pay higher wages and the growing demands of contractors to raise 
wages and commissions. The situation came to a head in 1897 when the 
price of sugar hit a new low, and contractors began withdrawing workers to 
other estates which were paying higher wages and commissions. For the time 
being, the Aspillagas allowed the work force to diminish, taking solace in the 
fact that this also reduced expenditures during a time of shrinking profits. 
But when the price of sugar rose modestly two years later, management con­
sented to an increase in wages and commissions, and there quickly followed 
an increase in the size of the work force. 
A similar situation occurred in 1902 when the price of sugar set another 
record low, causing a reduction in wages as well as the outright dismissal of 
several hundred workers. Nevertheless, once the price of sugar had risen far 
enough in management's judgment to justify increases in wages and com­
missions, hundreds of new workers appeared. 
T A B L E I 4 9 
Daily Cash Wages,* Contractors' Commissions, and the Si%e of the 
Work Force at Cayalti, iSf>/-ipoj 
Daily Cash Wage Contractors' Commissions 
Year (centavos) {percent of daily cash wage) Number of Workers 
1897 40 20 700 
1899 50 2}f 900 
1902 40 25 750 
1905 50 25 1,250 
* Wages were determined by piece work, and included a daily ration of beef, rice, 
and salt. In 1900 dollars, 40 centavos = 19-40 cents, and 50 centavos=24-25 cents. 
f In 1899, commissions were calculated on the basis of a 40 centavo cash wage. 
Nevertheless, there was still a 5 percent increase in commission. 
4 8
 A.H. to A.H., 12 November 1890, A.F.A.; A.H. to A.H., 19 January 1900, A.F.A.; 
B.A.B. to A.H., 13 February 1892, A.F.A.; A.H. to A.H., 27 July 1892, A .F .A; 
A.H. to A.H., 24 September 1895, A.F.A.; A.H. to A.H., 23 April 1895, A.F.A. 
4 9
 A.H. to A.H., 2 July 1897, A.F.A.; A.H. to A.H., 24 January 1899, A.F.A.; A.H. 
to Los Contratistas, 20 March 1899, A.F.A.; N. Salcedo to A.H., 4 March 1902, 
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Despite these periodic turnovers in the work force, a core of several 
hundred workers was required to keep the plantation running at all times. 
Among these workers there was a growing tendency to remain on the estate 
for longer periods of time. For example, in May of 1899 an Aspillaga wrote: 
The contractor Negrete, who has the most peons [400 in 1905], only occasionally 
receives a peon from his associate Zarate in the sierra. All of his peons, one can say, 
are contracted here, so that they have a constant body of workers [una peonada 
constante] . . . 5 0 
This, in turn, had a dramatic social impact on Cayalti, as a community of 
serranos was transferred to the coast. 
. . . we now have many peons from Celedin with the advantage that they have a 
temperament very similar to coastal dwellers and they become acclimatised more 
easily than others, although it is true that those from Bambamarca could not have 
become better acclimatised. We have here a true community from Bambamarca, 
people who have been accustomed [to Cayalti] in such a way that they do not 
move from here. [Moreover] . . .all come with their families.... 6 1 
Many of these workers clearly chose to remain longer, attracted by the good 
wages and the availability of credit in the form of advances on wages from 
contractors and the estate. This is shown by the fact that hundreds of workers 
were signing new contracts on the estate and establishing households there. 
The Aspillagas and contractors had sought the formation of a more per­
manent work force for obvious reasons. For the Aspillagas, permanency 
guaranteed an adequate number of workers to maintain desired production 
levels, while for contractors, re-signing workers on the estate reduced the 
number of recruiting trips and capital ouday, as initial advances were tradi­
tionally larger than supplemental loans. In addition to relatively good wages, 
which included daily rations of meat and rice, the Aspillagas enticed workers 
to remain by constructing better housing to supplement the dilapidated 
barracks (galpones) used to house the Chinese. The best of these new homes 
were given to workers with families because they remained the longest.52 
A.F.A.; Negrete Hnos. to A.H., 21 February 1902, A.F.A.; B.A.B. to A.H., 
4 February 1903, A.F.A.; S. Tello to B.A.B., 10 March 1903, A.F.A.; A.H. to 
A.H., 4 June 1895, A.F.A.; A.H. to A.H., 15 September 1897, A.F.A.; N. Salcedo 
to A.H., 5 May 1900, A.F.A.; B.AB. to A.H., 28 June 1902, A.F.A.; F. P£rez 
Cespedes to R.A.B., 18 August 1905, A.F.A. By 1905, virtually all Chinese workers 
had been replaced by Peruvians. The last mention of the Chinese at Cayalti was in 
1907 when thirty were expelled from the estate. See, V.A.T. to A.H., 12 September 
1907, A.F.A. 
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 A.H. to A.H., 9 May 1899, A.F.A. 
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 A.H. to A.H., 13 January 1900, A.F.A. 
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 A.H. to A.H., 19 January 1900, A.F.A.; A.H. to A.H., 29 March 1890, A.F.A.; 
A.H. to A.H., 27 May 1902, A.F.A. 
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Permanency is a much more complicated question than this, however, 
because many other workers were forced to remain on the estate undl they 
had repaid outstanding debts. Such compulsion has been referred to as in­
debted peonage. Indebted peonage was used by Cayalti to hold on to Chinese 
workers, and by hacendados throughout Latin America since the Colonial 
Period. In recent publications, however, it has been argued that the inci­
dence of indebted peonage and oppression has been greatly exaggerated, and 
that peasants, more often than not, freely sold their labour in an open mar­
ket.5 3 The discussion can perhaps be advanced by looking more closely at the 
demand for labour in the context of economic structure, political economy 
and social control. 
T o control their Chinese workers, the Aspillagas and other sugar planters 
had relied upon violence and indebted peonage, and they continued to use 
these methods with Peruvian peons. Planters could generally count on the 
support of local officials, who sometimes doubled as labour contractors. 
Moreover, the central government (in which sugar planters participated) 
condoned enganche and even used it on occasion for large construction 
projects in the sierra.54 However, no administration was likely to allow 
planters to intimidate Peruvian peons the way they did the Chinese, who 
were even subjected to torture and execution.55 Furthermore, the national 
government was never involved in the large scale recruitment and transporta­
tion of peons to plantations, as was the Diaz regime in Mexico,5 0 and peons 
sometimes benefited from squabbling between local officials and planters. 
Highlanders also had more options than the Chinese because of their 
greater physical mobility and the increasing demand for their labour.57 
An early reference to indebted peonage among Peruvian labourers finds 
the Aspillagas saying: 'You cannot imagine what we have to do to obtain 
people, to the extreme of deceiving the bastard peons who each day become 
more demoralized.. . . ' In the years to follow, they made these comments: 
We have only allowed to go those who have repaid their loans and, in spite of 
everything, there are more than 200 serranos.... Yesterday Mr. Sebastian Tello 
5 3
 For example, see Bauer, op. cit. 
8 4
 In the late 1890s the government used enganche to build a road from Tarma into 
the Selva. See El Comercio, November 28a, December 5b, 11a , 18a, 1896; February 
16a, March 23b, April 8b, June 14a, October 4b, 1897; May 14a, June 4b, 7b, July 
14b, 1898. I am indebted to Peter Blanchard for this reference. 
8 5
 Gonzales, op. cit. Chapter VI. 
5 6
 Friedrich Katz, 'Labor Conditions on Haciendas in Porfirian Mexico: Some Trends 
and Tendencies,' Hispanic American Historical Review, No. 54 (February 1974), 
pp. 15-23 . 
8 7
 On the Chinese, see Gonzales, op. cit., Chapters V and VI. 
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told me that the Negretes [contractors] were going to have to take 200 men to 
Tuman [a neighboring estate] and that they were about to pay what they owed to 
the estate. That I cannot believe, and if such a thing is attempted, I will tell them 
that while they do not pay in labour what they owe they cannot move those 
people from the estate. We will see how things develop. I will try to manage them 
with the utmost calm and sagacity.68 
Forcing indebted workers to remain on the estate was of questionable 
legality. But there is also a point of legality here with respect to peons. 
They guaranteed repayment of their loans from contractors, and those who 
defaulted somedmes had their property (or that of a co- signer) confiscated.59 
The Aspillagas, however, did not require promissory notes, preferring to 
pressure contractors to get their money back for them, and to organize posses 
to hunt down debtors who had fled the estate. More will be said about this 
later.80 
After they began work on Cayalti, many workers accumulated substantial 
debts, up to S/.100 and more, and then found it difficult to repay such large 
sums.6 1 One principal reason for this was that many workers could not work 
a full work week. New workers in particular found it difficult to adjust to a 
regimented work routine and to the hot coastal climate. Moreover, there was 
always a large number of ill workers, the result of the presence of a variety 
of communicable diseases (including malaria, yellow fever, tuberculosis, 
influenza, and bubonic plague), and the Aspillagas' failure to provide 
adequate medical care.0 2 
Indebted peonage, of course, benefited the Aspillagas most during periods 
of labour shortages. For example, in March 1891, a larger than usual work 
force was needed to clean the main irrigation canal, a major undertaking in 
itself, and to begin milling after a temporary shutdown. As the Aspillagas 
explained later, they managed to retain enough workers to accomplish both 
jobs because 'we have only let go those who have paid their loan. . . ' o s 
Indebted peonage was, however, a double-edged sword for the Aspillagas. 
When they had an adequate number of workers (or a surplus) they com­
plained about the large sums of money that they had sunk into workers' 
0 8
 A.H. to A.H., 14 October 1879, A.F.A.; A.H. to A.H. 25 March 1891, A.F.A.; 
Francisco Perez Cespedes to A.H., 5 April 1902, A.F.A. 
0 9
 Felipe Yanes Abarca, 'Sistema de enganche, Distrito de Sorochuco-Hacienda 
Cayalti' (B.S. Thesis, Pontificia Universidad Cat61ica del Peru, 1972). 
6 0
 A.H. to A.H. 2 July 1897, A.F.A.; V.A.T. to A.H., 28 August 1907, A.F.A. 
6 1
 A.H. to A.H., 15 November 1892, A.F.A. and below. In 1900 dollars, S/. 
100 = 548.50. 
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 See Gonzales, op. cit. Chapters VI and VIII. 
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 A.H. to A.H., 25 March 1891, A.F.A. 
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loans. This was a particularly serious problem during periods of very low 
sugar prices.64 Another problem was that some peons received loans from 
more than one contractor (plus the estate), sometimes using fictitious names. 
The chief engineer, the Englishman Thomas Colston, once even stated that 
some mill workers purposely ran up a debt so as to ensure themselves regular 
employment.65 
The estate also had to concern itself with what to do with ill or injured 
peons who were indebted but could not work. If these workers were expelled 
from the estate, the plantation lost money. But if they were retained, they 
occupied valuable housing and did little or no work. Twice during die early 
twentieth century, a period of especially low sugar prices, management chose 
to expell seriously ill workers, assuming that they would never be able to 
repay their debts in any case. Generally, however, debilitated workers simply 
wasted away on the plantation itself.66 
There were other ways to circumvent indebted peonage. Indebted workers 
could receive permission from the estate or their contractors to visit neigh­
bouring towns or their relatives in the sierra. Furthermore, almost from the 
onset of enganche the Aspillagas and contractors had to contend with in­
debted peons fleeing from the estate. The reasons for escapes were not 
mysterious. Clearly, some new recruits found it difficult to adjust to the work 
routine and climate but workers also fled from their debts or to seek higher 
wages elsewhere.67 
Contractors on neighbouring estates signed on escaped peons sometimes, 
but not always, unaware that they were runaways. This practice made the 
capturing of escapees particularly difficult, as contractors were naturally 
reluctant to return runaways once they had advanced them money.6 8 
Cayalti attempted to prevent escapes by having peons supervised while 
they worked. The Aspillagas generally blamed supervisors (caporales) for 
escapes, although caporales typically had to supervise from 50 to 100 peons 
who might be spread out over a considerable area. Peons could also hide in 
groves of mature cane, which grew far above their heads, or in irrigation 
0* A.H. to A.H., 29 March 1898, A.F.A.; V.A.T. to A.H., 31 August 1908, A.F.A.; 
Francisco Perez C&pedes to A.H., 9 March 1902, A.F.A. 
6 5
 S.E. Medina to A.A.B., 5 August 1902, A.F.A.; Thomas Colston to A . H , 14 Octo­
ber 1901, A.F.A. 
6 6
 Gonzales, op. cit., Chapter VII. 
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 Correspondence of Tuman and Cayalti, A.F.A. 
6 8
 Correspondence of Catalino Coronado, A.F.A.; A.H. to A.H., 18 November 1887, 
A.F.A.; B.A.B. to A.H., 6 December 1902, A.F.A.; Negrete Hnos. to A.H., 12 June 
1903, A .F .A; V.A.T to A.H., 11 August 1908, A.F.A.; V.A.T. to A.H., 14 October 
1908, A.F.A.; B.A.B. to A.H., 26 October 1908, A.F.A. 
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canals, and take advantage of the lack of electric lighting to escape into the 
night.0 0 
Once peons had escaped from Cayalti, caporales and sometimes contractors 
organized search parties and local authorities, and planters were notified. 
Nevertheless, rival planters and contractors did not always allow caporales 
to search for runaways on their estates, especially if some of their peons had 
been recently stolen.70 Moreover, it is difficult to judge how much assistance 
the Aspillagas received from public officials in capturing runaways. A letter 
from a contractor in Bambamarca in 1905 suggests that local officials there 
(including the judge) generally jailed runaways upon request until they could 
be taken down to the coast. However, the letter went on to complain that in 
recent weeks normal co-operation had not been forthcoming.71 In 1908, an 
Aspillaga suggested that the family might receive greater co-operation from 
the Governor of Sana if it offered to pay him 50 centavos for every runaway 
from Cayalti he captured, which was 50 centavos less than contractors in the 
neighbouring Chicama Valley paid their local governor.7 2 
It is impossible to calculate how many peons escaped from Cayalti during 
these years. However, it is more important to understand what impact 
escapes had on enganche. and the efficacy of indebted peonage. The frequency 
of escapes, I believe, points to three conclusions: (1) Escapes softened the 
effectiveness of indebted peonage but did not render it totally ineffective, 
especially during periods of labour shortages when the estate was likely to 
hold on to workers at all costs. ( 2 ) Despite escapes, labour was easy enough to 
acquire, given the proper incentives, so that new peons could be found to 
replace runaways. Therefore, the prevalence of escapes did not seriously 
threaten the operation of the estate. (3) Escapes were, undoubtedly, a financial 
drain on contractors and planters. However, in the long run, both profited 
from the sugar industry. 7 3 
Conclusion 
It is clear that market forces and capital incentives played an important 
role in the operation of enganche. Peons sought high wages on the coast, 
migrating and establishing households hundreds of miles from their homes. 
69 Negrete Hnos. to A.H., 12 June 1903, A.F.A.; S. Tello to A.H., 25 October 1905, 
A.F.A.; V.A.T. to A.H., 14 October 1908, A.F.A.; B.A.B. to A.H., 26 October 
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They even moved from one estate to another in search of higher incomes. 
Planters could also pull the strings on labour supply, under normal con­
ditions, through the allocation of money for advances to labour contractors. 
The offering of loans and comparatively good wages was enticement enough 
for many to migrate, although others agreed to work on the coast to cancel an 
old debt. The amount of capital planters were willing to advance to con­
tractors, in turn, depended largely on the price of sugar on the world market. 
This was the link that connected Liverpool with a tiny village in the Peruvian 
highlands. 
It should not be forgotten, however, that deception and coercion also 
played a part in labour contracting. At Cayalti, the Aspillagas did what they 
could to acquire a stable work force, regardless of the legal and moral impli­
cations. They had fewer restrictions on their actions during the years of 
economic and political chaos, from roughly 1873-1895, and it was easier for 
them to exploit the Chinese, who as foreigners from a weak kingdom were 
not well protected. The Aspillagas did not have much more respect for the 
civil and human rights of Peruvian peons, but as the economy and state 
became more organized they could not rely as heavily on violence to control 
the work force. This did not prevent contractors, however, from tricking 
peons into signing contracts nor the Aspillagas from attempting to bind 
indebted workers to the estate. 
Thus, what emerges from this analysis is a new interpretation of enganche. 
By paying closer attention to changes in the regional and international 
economies, and relating them to socio-political reality, labour contracting 
appears not as semi-slavery, as described by its early opponents, nor as a free 
market system of labour supply, as some have recently said. Rather, it clearly 
reflects both the demands of the marketplace and evolving methods of social 
and political control which did not always protect human and civil rights. 
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APPENDIX 
Price of Raw Sugar {Cost, Insurance, Freight) in 
London, 1872-190; 
(Shillings Per Cwt.) 
Year Price Year Price 
1872 25/6 1889 16/0 
1873 22/6 1890 13/0 
1874 21/6 1891 13/6 
1875 20/0 1892 13/6 
1876 21/6 1893 14/3 
1877 24/6 1894 11/3 
1878 20/0 1895 10/0 
1879 19/0 1896 10/9 
1880 20/6 1897 9/3 
1881 21/3 1898 9/6 
1882 20/0 1899 10/6 
1883 19/0 1900 " / 3 
1884 13/3 1901 9/3 
1885 13/6 1902 7/3 
1886 11/9 1903 8/6 
1887 11/9 1904 10/3 
1888 13/0 1905 11 /o 
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